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ABSTRACT
This article is a response to McLeod and Baylis (2007) who speculate on
the dangers of requesting fresh ‘spare’ embryos from IVF patients for
human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, particularly when those
embryos are good enough to be transferred back to the woman. They argue
that these embryos should be frozen instead. We explore what is meant
by ‘spare’ embryos. We then provide empirical evidence, from a study of
embryo donation and of embryo donors’ views, to substantiate some of their
speculations about the problems associated with requesting fresh embryos.
However, we also question whether such problems are resolved by embryo
freezing, since further empirical evidence suggests that this raises other
social and ethical problems for patients. There is little evidence that the
request for embryos for research, in itself, causes patients distress. We
suggest, however, that no requests for fresh embryos should be made in
the first cycle of IVF treatment. Deferring the request to a later cycle
ensures that potential donors are better informed (by experience and reflec-
tion) about the possible destinations of their embryos and about the defi-
nition of ‘spare embryos’. Both this article, and that by McLeod and Baylis,
emphasize the need to consider the views and experiences of embryo
donors when evaluating the ethics of embryo donation for hESC research.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is written in response to McLeod and Baylis1
who argue that ‘spare’ fresh embryos that are good
enough to be transferred to the woman for treatment
should not be donated2 to human embryonic stem cell
(hESC) research, since doing so is not in the woman’s
self- or other-regarding interests. They conclude that this
practice ‘is so fraught with difficulties that it simply ought
not to take place’.3 Such embryos, they assert, should be
frozen so that decisions about what happens to them can
be taken at a time and place separate from the IVF
process.
McLeod and Baylis raise some important issues: the
need to consider the experiences of those being asked to
donate embryos; the need to question what types of
embryos are being donated (fresh or frozen; suitable for
transfer or unsuitable for transfer); and whose interests
those donations serve. Their analysis, however, is based
on speculations about what might happen when the
request to donate is made and how potential donors
might reason their way through such requests. It is
useful to compare these speculations with empirical evi-
dence and evaluate what this evidence contributes to
1 C. McLeod & F. Baylis. Donating Fresh Versus Frozen Embryos to
Stem Cell Research: in Whose Interests? Bioethics 2007; 21: 465–477.
2 ‘Donation’ is an increasingly problematic term since it implies certain
motivations: Haimes has argued for the use of ‘provision’ as a less
value-laden term; E. Haimes. Acquiring and providing human organs,
gametes and tissue in the clinical context: socio-cultural issues. Presen-
tation to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Workshop: Volunteering,
donation and payment in the clinical context December, 2008, London. 3 McLeod & Baylis, op. cit. note 1, p. 477.
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understandings of the issues raised.4 This is what we do in
this article.
First we examine the term ‘spare’ when used with ref-
erence to embryos. Then we present empirical evidence
from a UK Wellcome Trust-funded study on potential
donors’ experiences of being asked to donate embryos for
hESC research. We then review the evidence on issues
that arise following embryo freezing, to evaluate whether
freezing is a solution to the concerns raised by McLeod
and Baylis. There are many other points raised in their
rich article that deserve attention but space constraints
require this more specific focus. We reach similar conclu-
sions about the need for patients to have ‘time and dis-
tance from their IVF treatment that would allow them to
reflect carefully on whether they want to donate excess
embryos’5 though we suggest different ways to achieve
that opportunity for reflection.
II. DEFINING ‘SPARE’
The term ‘spare’, with reference to embryos being
donated for research, is a highly contestable concept.
First, ‘spare’ can refer to the quality of the embryo (not
good enough either for transfer or freezing). Second,
embryos can be designated ‘spare’ because of constraints
on options within any particular cycle within any particu-
lar clinic (such as when the woman has had the maximum
allowable number of embryos transferred, and or when
the clinic follows a freezing policy that sets limits on
either the maximum or minimum number of embryos
that can be frozen) even though the patient still wants to
use them and might not consider them ‘spare’. Third,
embryos can be designated ‘spare’ by patients who have
finished their reproductive projects (because of success or
deciding to end treatment). In addition, ‘spare’ might not
mean ‘spare for research’: other infertile patients might
prefer these embryos be donated for their treatment.
Thus, the quality of ‘spare-ness’ is not inherent to the
embryo but rather is dependent on the context in which
this is considered a relevant designation and on the
authority, power or interests of particular groups or indi-
viduals to apply that label in pursuit of certain goals.6
The designation of ‘spare’ is perhaps most contentious
in the ‘constraints-on-options’ scenario described above
as it has the most potential to conflict with the couple’s
own views and interests. It is this that McLeod and Baylis
refer to when they discuss the donation of embryos that
are good enough to be transferred or frozen for later use.
Their contribution is important as few previous articles
have addressed the issues around the possibility that
embryos that are good enough either to be transferred or
frozen for future use are being donated for research.
Also, few bioethics articles have addressed the question
of the relative scientific usefulness of these different types
of embryos (fresh or frozen; good enough or not good
enough for transfer) for hESC research. However, their
proposed solution, of freezing these embryos, has its own
difficulties.
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
EMBRYO DONATION
This study was conducted in one fertility clinic in the UK.
All couples undergoing IVF treatment over a 10 month
period in 2005–2006 who were asked to donate ‘spare’
embryos for hESC research were contacted on behalf of
the social researchers, approximately six weeks after
receiving their pregnancy result, to request participation
in an interview to explore their views and experiences.
Forty-four in-depth interviews were conducted; most
couples had consented to donate embryos at some point
though not all consented to the full range of studies and
not all donated in every cycle.
Choosing to donate, or not, is a decision positioned in
relation to other aspects of interviewees’ lives, including,
most crucially, the decision to seek IVF treatment in the
first place. Couples can only be asked to donate because
they are going through IVF; for them, having ‘our baby’
is the primary concern and forms the backdrop to the
request to donate embryos. They are, from their point of
view, ‘IVF patients’ rather than ‘potential embryo
donors’.7
Our study indicates some support for McLeod and
Baylis’ argument that providing for research embryos
that are good enough to be transferred to the woman is
against the woman’s self-interest. This is reflected in what
interviewees said once they had time to reflect on the IVF
process and realize that some of their embryos might
have been used for research. We use the phrase the ‘trou-
bling third embryo’ to refer to these embryos, the discus-
sion of which aroused puzzlement as to what had actually
happened to them and triggered the most overt displays
4 E. Haimes. What Can the Social Sciences Contribute to the Study of
Ethics?, Bioethics 2002; 16: 89–113; E. Haimes & R. Williams. ‘Sociol-
ogy, Ethics and the Priority of the Particular: Learning from a Case
Study of Genetic Deliberations’, Br J Sociol, 2007; 58: 457–476;
B. Molewijk & L. Frith. Empirical Ethics: Who Is The Don Quixote?
Bioethics 2009; 23: ii–iv.
5 McLeod & Baylis, op. cit. note 1, p. 477. See also Nisker, J. et al.
Development and Investigation of a Free and Informed Choice Process
for Embryo Donation to Stem Cell Research in Canada. J Obstet
Gynaecol Can 2006; 10: 903–908.
6 See also; S. Holm. The Spare Embryo – a Red Herring in the Embryo
Experimentation Debate, Health Care Anal 1993; 1: 63–66; M. Svend-
sen & L. Koch. Unpacking the Spare Embryo: Facilitating Stem Cell
Research in a Moral Landscape, Soc Stud Sci 2008; 38: 93–110.
7 E. Haimes & K. Taylor. The Experiences and Values of IVF Couples
Who Were Asked to Donate Fresh Embryos for Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Research: Their Views on Embryos, Hum Reprod 2009; 24:
2142–2150.
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of distress.8 At least thirteen couples questioned what had
happened to their top quality embryos that were neither
transferred nor frozen. Some simply did not know what
had happened:
I did think about it at the time and then it went out
of [my] head but I will mention it now [short
pause] . . . Three fertilized . . . ethically they could
only put two back in, so obviously I had one still good
egg that had fertilized . . . nobody asked me what I
wanted doing with that. And that happened both
times. I just [assumed], wrongly or rightly, that it
wasn’t worth their while freezing it ‘cos there was only
one, so therefore rather than waste it, they would use it
for research. But it was never actually mentioned.
(IVF16:1088–1128).
This aspect of her treatment clearly continues to puzzle
her. Another said: ‘. . . all three were at the same stage so
I thought it was a shame to take two and leave one out
but that’s just the way it is. They can’t put back any more
than that because it would be unsafe, so what can you
do?’ (IVF3:869–885). Her tone of resignation and regret
is echoed by another couple:
The three that were good to use, they had said they
chose what they thought were the best two. So, at the
time, no, you don’t consider about the third one. Now
we can [perhaps] think, ‘if that one had been put in
[perhaps] that one would have worked’ whereas the
other two hadn’t. But there wouldn’t be any point in
doing that . . . (IVF19:1018–1064)
Another said about the third embryo, ‘you can’t help
thinking at the back of your mind, ‘that might be my one
chance of having a baby and I’ve given it away for this
research’ (IVF6.2: 351–396).
Others were less accepting. One woman said she had
produced ‘six really good quality [embryos] and we had
two go back . . . well, I signed the form, I signed the form,
that was [my] decision to make [short pause]. But it’s the
good ones that upset me, the four little good ones’
(IVF18: 1718–1741). Earlier she had reflected that on
both cycles of treatment, some embryos had deteriorated
overnight and had not been good enough to freeze and
therefore, ‘The second [cycle], I just wished I hadn’t
signed the form, just for a comparison, to see if there
would have been just that one more, enough to be able to
freeze’ (IVF18:437–446). This woman is taking responsi-
bility for her decision to sign the consent form to donate
embryos to research whilst also raising questions about
the consequences of having done so. Her continued
uncertainty about these consequences, after several cycles
of treatment, suggests either a problem with the consent
procedures or in her understanding of the decision-
making around donation.9
Uncertainty featured in other couples’ experiences:
I know they’ll only put two back but when they say to
you, ‘there’s three good quality embryos suitable to
put back in, so we’ve picked two of them’, you think,
‘there’s only one, that one left might have
worked’ . . . I know the people that are actually doing
the procedure know best but they should still give you
the option whether or not you want to put the three
back in if you’ve only got three . . . if there’s only three
and they’re saying that they’re good enough to go in,
but you can only put two in and the other one, ‘sorry
we can’t freeze one’ then they should give you the
option of putting it in. (IVF13:1411–1497)
Another woman described how her realization that good
embryos could go to research emerged, as she went
through treatment and then reflected afterwards. We
quote her at length to illustrate the development of her
thinking over time. Referring to the early stages of the
IVF process she said:
. . . at that stage it all seemed fairly straightforward
to me. The only time I found it much harder was
when there was a fertilized egg that they couldn’t
freeze, and I wasn’t happy with it at that stage
. . . that possibility had not occurred to me – that
you’d have a viable embryo that they would not
freeze . . . (IVF14:130–147).
When asked about how she compared the transferred to
the non-transferred embryos she said:
At that point? I was worried about the actual [trans-
ferred] embryos at that point and it was only after-
wards I thought, ‘that [non-transferred] embryo would
be going for research’ and that if I’d thought about
that at the time I probably wouldn’t have been so
happy . . . if they’d been rotten embryos, and not
going to do anything, then that would have been some-
thing [else] but they were saying that that one was
okay . . . I just thought that was something I had to
come to terms with . . . I found it silly that I should
8 Reference to the ‘third’ embryo is shorthand: in the UK usually only
two embryos can be transferred back to the woman in any single cycle
of treatment; if she has more than two good quality embryos these can,
in theory, be frozen. At the time of our research, this particular clinic
had had a longstanding policy of freezing a minimum of four top quality
embryos in any one cycle. This policy was rooted in a cautious view of
the efficacy of using frozen-thawed embryos in treatment, so some
couples could have had up to three top quality embryos that were
neither transferred nor frozen. IVF is still an evolving field and elements
of that policy have since changed.
9 We note however that there is some uncertainty in the details of her
response anyway since if she had had four good quality embryos
remaining they would have qualified, numerically, for being frozen.
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find that harder when . . . there was no way I could get
that [embryo] saved . . . There was nothing I could do
for it. I wasn’t really quite as clinical or sensible as I
thought I was . . . I’d never thought of that possibili-
ty . . . I didn’t know how I was going to feel about
anything to be honest, and it was all very, very
new . . . I was prepared for every other step of not
getting enough eggs, or not getting any fertilized eggs,
but I wasn’t actually prepared for that step of having
to throw one away. (IVF14: 155–243)
Later she made her point more strongly:
I felt differently about donating the viable embry-
o . . . because the way I felt it had been worded was, or
how I understood it, was all the viable ones would be
frozen and I’d obviously not understood that that
might not happen. The non-viable embryos that
weren’t suitable for freezing and the eggs that didn’t
fertilize, I had no problems with, but the viable
embryo, yes I did . . . I don’t think I had really appre-
ciated the emotional aspect of [long pause] the emo-
tional aspect of, the wasting my own eggs, if you see
what I mean? That that was a loss . . . (IVF14:
469–591)
This woman was pregnant at the time of interview so
her words counter the view that pregnancy eliminates any
difficulties experienced with IVF in general or in being
asked to donate to research. These elements of the treat-
ment and consent process were raised at an unusually
early stage in this interview, compared to others, indicat-
ing that the issue was still very pertinent for her. The
language of ‘saving’ the embryo and of ‘loss’, alongside
the references to ‘feeling silly’ and not being so ‘clinical’
suggest a depth of feeling for which she had not been
prepared. She makes an honest distinction about the
consent process, between both how it was worded and
how she had understood it, through which she takes
responsibility for her decisions.10 Clearly it is preferable if
consent procedures do not leave room for these sorts of
misunderstandings or uncertainties.
Other data indicate that, perhaps not surprisingly,
some couples do think about all the non-transferred
embryos that might have worked, but the above data
show that those with more than two good quality
embryos face a starker contrast between embryos that
had had quite a good chance of working (at least as good
as the two that were transferred) and those that had never
had much chance, being of poorer quality. It is then an
additional burden to realize that the third (fourth/fifth)
good quality embryo(s) might have gone to research
instead, especially when other data suggest that the
nature of that research is something they would rather
not contemplate.11
Several couples questioned whether some embryos were
deliberately not transferred or frozen in order that they
could go for research. One couple speculated apologeti-
cally:
. . . it’s now the third time . . . your mind does start
racing and you start thinking about what’s happened
and how things have worked. [short pause] It’s upset-
ting really to think that possibly on that first occasion
we did have these seven embryos and they weren’t
frozen. Now from my memory they were all decent
embryos . . . I seem to remember getting told that we
had nine decent ones. (IVF28: 452–481)
Another couple was very direct:
. . . four times we’ve been through the cycle we’ve
never had any frozen. And that was one of our con-
cerns – that they weren’t being frozen because they
were wanting them for the research . . . they never
actually [came] back and said they weren’t good
enough to freeze but they were good enough for
research, or they weren’t good enough for research
either . . . they just said the quality was no good and
that was all. Nothing more was said. The quality isn’t
good enough to freeze them, they wouldn’t survive the
process of freezing. (IVF15:387–420)
Whilst this might not be a case of good quality embryos
going to research it is worth noting that the dual pro-
cesses of treatment and research raised doubt in some
patients’ minds.
Others wondered if embryos had not been frozen as a
direct consequence of having consented to donate. One
couple had decided to donate only embryos that were not
of good enough quality to transfer but then had doubts as
to what actually happened:
There were discrepancies in my mind as to what was
the right quality and what wasn’t. And I felt like the
second time I didn’t want to donate them. . . . I don’t
know whether I was just all emotional or hormonal
. . . but I felt like there’d been a bit of a conspiracy to
get our [embryos] because we’d signed this form. And
I know there probably wasn’t but at the time . . . you
don’t know where you’re at, it’s such an emotionally
charged time . . . I felt like things happened that
shouldn’t have happened and I felt like we didn’t get to
know exactly what went wrong. (IVF18: 326–385)10 The practicalities of fieldwork meant that we were unable to observe
the consenting procedures so cannot comment directly on this but the
willingness of many interviewees to take responsibility for their deci-
sions to donate deserves further attention, especially in light of McLeod
and Baylis’ concern that women might be coerced or exploited. 11 Haimes and Taylor 2009, op. cit. note 7, p. 2147.
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That they were puzzling over this raises questions as to
whether these interviewees trusted the clinical team to
prioritize their interests.12
These data endorse McLeod and Baylis’ concerns
about the donation to research of fresh embryos that
would have been good enough to use in treatment. In
summary, interviewees’ concerns encompass: doubts
about whether the best embryos were transferred; confu-
sion about what happened to the good-enough-to-be-
transferred embryos that were not transferred; feelings of
regret about the waste of good embryos; whether they
should have insisted that these embryos be frozen; an
emergence of suspicion that the clinic might be prioritiz-
ing research over treatment, and whether consenting to
donate to research meant that they were not being given
the best possible chance of getting pregnant. It is also
clear that they only realized that they might have donated
good embryos to research after the cycle had ended: they
did not fully appreciate at the time of consenting to
donate that this possibility might arise. They mention the
challenges of the IVF process, particularly during the first
cycle, and there being so much going on that it was dif-
ficult to understand all that was happening.
Clearly the timing and nature of the consent process
play a crucial part in shaping potential donors’ under-
standings and responses. It is for these, and other reasons
(see below) that McLeod and Baylis argue that IVF
patients should not be asked to donate fresh embryos.
Rather, they argue, patients should be given the oppor-
tunity to freeze any surplus embryos and then decide
whether they want to donate these after careful reflection:
‘patients are better off freezing their excess fresh
embryos, rather than donating them to research’.13
From the above data we have some sympathy for this
view and for the view that freezing provides time for
patients to reflect and develop an understanding of what
it is they are being asked to do. However freezing then
thawing embryos creates other problems, which McLeod
and Baylis do not consider. The fact that embryo freezing
is a popular option14 does not make it an efficacious one.
In order to evaluate the different ways of protecting
donors’ interests the empirical evidence on the costs and
benefits for patients of freezing needs to be reviewed.
IV. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FREEZING EMBRYOS
In addition to McLeod and Baylis’ arguments, the ratio-
nale for freezing good embryos is that this reduces the
need for women to undergo ovarian stimulation and egg
retrieval in later cycles. This reduces the health risks of
hyperstimulation, reduces the psychological stress of the
IVF process on women, and improves the cumulative
pregnancy rate.15 It also saves time and money, for clinics
and patients.
However, there are many questions to ask about freez-
ing embryos: is it safe; how effective is it in producing
successful pregnancies; could freezing raise false hopes;
could freezing even lead to women undergoing more
cycles of treatment; and is it financially worthwhile? Also,
does freezing have other emotional, ethical or social costs
and, if so, who bears them?
Although embryo-freezing is a well established prac-
tice, there is surprisingly little published material address-
ing these questions. Also, in the UK it is difficult to
obtain reliable information about the freezing policies
different clinics adopt and on their management of frozen
embryos. Authors comment on the variability between
individual clinics, between and within countries, and on
the cultural variations whereby different countries allow
different things to be done or not done with frozen
embryos.16 Estimates suggest that, in 2002, 400,000
frozen embryos existed in the USA, 52,000 in the UK and
over 71,000 in Australia.17 Baylis et al.18 report that in
2003 the 54% of Canadian fertility centres that responded
to a request for data held 15,615 embryos. These numbers
are significant and highlight the need to research the
questions we raised above. Lyerly et al.19 also note that
public debate lacks empirical data on the attitudes of
those who have to make decisions about these embryos.
Bankowski et al.20 report that cryopreservation is gen-
erally safe, though there are hazards associated with viral
contamination, clerical errors on labelling embryos, and
accidental destruction of frozen embryos. This general
level of safety means that most debates around cryo-
preservation focus on the ethics of embryo disposition
rather than on freezing itself. These authors also note that
in 2002, 17.9% of all transfers in the USA were performed
using cryopreserved embryos and that embryo cryo-
preservation had increased the ongoing pregnancy rate
12 It should be noted, however, that the majority opinion about the
clinic, the staff and the treatment received, though not blindly uncriti-
cal, was very positive.
13 McLeod & Baylis, op. cit. note 1, p. 469.
14 Ibid: 469.
15 A.D. Lyerly et al. Factors that Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions
About Disposition of Frozen Embryos, Fertil Steril 2006; 85: 1623–
1630; B. Bankowski et al. The Social Implications of Embryo Cryo-
preservation, Fertil Steril 2005; 84: 823–832.
16 Gurmankin and Caplan, 2004, cited in S. de Lacey. Patients’ Atti-
tudes to Their Embryos and Their Destiny, Best Pract Res Clin Obstet
and Gynaecol 2007; 21: 101–112, p. 109; J. Leach Scully & C. Rehmann-
Sutter. Creating Donors: the 2005 Swiss Law on Donation of Spare
Embryos to hESC Research, J Bioeth Inq 2006; 3: 81–93.
17 Lyerly et al., op. cit. note 15, p. 1623; Bankowski et al., op. cit. note
15, p. 823; de Lacey, op. cit. note 16, p. 103.
18 F. Baylis et al. Cryopreserved human embryos in Canada and their
availability for research; J Obstet Gynaecol Can; 2003; 25: 1026–1031.
19 Lyerly et al., op. cit. note 15, p. 1623.
20 Bankowski et al., op. cit. note 15, pp. 824–825.
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per oocyte retrieval by 6.6% and lowered the cost per
delivered baby to between 25%–45% of the cost of a fresh
cycle.
These financial and other benefits should be seen in the
context reported by Lyerly and Faden21 that in 2003 in
the USA only 65% of embryos survived thawing. Reports
from UK clinics22 suggest these figures have changed little
over the last five years. Of 24 clinics providing informa-
tion on freezing, only 18 reported survival rates, post-
thawing; these ranged from 50%–80% with the majority
reporting between 60%–70%. Ten clinics indicate that
pregnancy rates using frozen- thawed embryos are signifi-
cantly reduced compared with fresh embryo transfer
cycles, though only three provide figures, quoting 10%–
20% against pregnancy rates of between 30%–40% using
fresh embryo transfer. Therefore an IVF couple might
not have quite as many ‘banked’ embryos as hoped and
there is the danger that freezing raises false hopes about
the ability of frozen embryos to produce a pregnancy.23
Of course the reduction in viability can be set against
the removal of the risks of ovarian hyperstimulation.
While it is true that most of the risks of IVF are removed
if the thawed embryos are replaced in a natural cycle, for
many women replacement will take place during cycles
mediated by the same range of drugs required during
transfer of fresh embryos, albeit without hyperstimula-
tion and egg retrieval. The reduction of viability follow-
ing freezing could also lead women to require more cycles
of treatment rather than fewer if, as is likely using thawed
embryos, treatment is not successful and several cycles
are undertaken using up the frozen embryos before
embarking again on a full cycle of treatment. Thus there
is still some risk and burden faced by women.
Practicalities, such as the costs of storing frozen
embryos, need to be considered.24 De Lacey claims that
the introduction of a fee for freezing ‘was associated with’
a threefold increase in patients deciding to destroy their
frozen embryos.25 Most, though not all, clinics in the UK
charge patients for freezing and storage of embryos,
ranging in late 2008 from free to £800 for freezing and a
further £200–£500 per annum for storage. One final,
practical, consideration is whether freezing is legally
available. Leach Scully and Rehmann-Sutter26 note that
cryopreservation of IVF embryos, for any purpose, has
been forbidden in Switzerland since 2001.
Equally important, in view of McLeod and Baylis’ con-
cerns, is whether embryo freezing has other emotional,
ethical and social costs, and, if so, who bears these costs?
There is growing evidence that this is the case. First, there
is the problem of unclaimed or unused frozen embryos.27
Nisker et al. (2006) suggest that some couples who had
previously consented to donate frozen embryos to
research changed their minds when contacted specifically
to request donation to hESC research.28 Newton et al.29
found that ‘a substantial number of patients will not
return for stored embryos’ and noted that many patients
will not provide a final directive for embryo disposition
even when re-contacted. As Bankowski et al.30 report,
patients can choose inaction, keeping embryos stored in
preference to making any other decisions.
Second, de Lacey31 argues that freezing raises moral
and legal problems, given that patients’ circumstances
change over time and different issues arise, such as who
owns the embryos and who has the right to decide what
should be done with them, and after how long a time
period. Fuscaldo et al. say that most participants in their
study of couples with embryos in storage ‘described the
process of making a decision about surplus embryos as
difficult and emotionally fraught’;32 their findings concur
with those of Nachtigall et al., McMahon et al. and of de
Lacey33 who says that once couples had decided that they
would not use the embryos for themselves, the decision
about what to do with them ‘was much harder than they
imagined and fraught with moral ramifications.’ In a later
article de Lacey argues that the ‘process of determining
an outcome for frozen embryos is a complex human expe-
rience, the depth of which has not yet been fully
described’.34
Whilst some argue from empirical evidence that these
difficulties can be overcome,35 the stress of the decision
making needs to be compared with the stress which
McLeod and Baylis speculate arises from not having the
option of freezing. Lasting effects of cryopreservation on
21 A.D. Lyerly & R. Faden. Willingness to Donate Frozen Embryos for
Stem Cell Research, Sciencexpress 2007; 21 June: p. 2.
22 Using information obtained from links to clinics on www.hfea.
gov.uk [Accessed 3 April 2009].
23 Lyerly et al., op. cit. note 15, p. 1626.
24 Lyerly et al., op. cit. note 15, pp. 1625–1626.
25 De Lacey, op. cit. note 16, p. 104.
26 Leach Scully & Rehmann-Sutter, op. cit. note 16.
27 Bankowski et al. op. cit. note 15; G. Fuscaldo, S. Russell & L.
Gilliam. How to Facilitate Decisions About Surplus Embryos. Hum
Reprod 2007; 22: 3129–3138; S. Klock, S. Shenin & R. Kazer. The
Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos. N Engl J Med 2001; 345:
69–70.
28 Nisker et al. op. cit. note 5.
29 C. Newton et al. Changes in Patient Preferences in the Disposal of
Cryopreserved Embryos. Hum Reprod 2007; 22: 3124–3128: 3127.
30 Bankowski et al., op. cit. note 15.
31 de Lacey, op. cit. note 16.
32 Fuscaldo et al. op. cit. note 27, p. 3137.
33 R.D. Nachtigall et al. Parents’ Conceptualization of Their Frozen
Embryos Complicates the Disposition Decision, Fertil Steril 2005; 84:
431–434; C.A. McMahon et al. Mothers Conceiving Through IVF: Sib-
lings, Setbacks and Embryo Dilemmas After Five Years, Reprod Tech
2000; 10: 131–135; S. de Lacey. Parent Identity and ‘Virtual’ Children:
Why Patients Discard Rather Than Donate Unused Embryos. Hum
Reprod 2005; 20: 1661–1669: p. 1664.
34 S. de Lacey. Decisions for the Fate of Frozen Embryos, Hum Reprod
2007; 22: 1751–1758: p. 1752.
35 Fuscaldo et al. op. cit. note 27; Lyerly et al. op. cit. note 15.
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psychosocial health need further study.36 Account also
has to be taken of those embryos that are disputed over in
cases of divorce, death, and laboratory or clinic error.37
Stress is added by the fact that advance directives about
what couples want to happen to their surplus frozen
embryos prove to be an unreliable indicator of what they
finally decide.38 Preferences for disposition are based on
changing information and experiences and are therefore
‘dynamic’.39
In one study some patients wondered if they chose the
option of freezing out of an inappropriate level of trust in
the clinical team and an ‘uncritical acceptance’ of cryo-
preservation.40 Many interviewees ‘found . . . none of the
available choices for embryo disposition was ideal or
even acceptable’.41 These authors conclude, ‘Clinicians
should understand that IVF patients’ willingness to par-
ticipate in embryo cryopreservation does not necessarily
indicate a reasoned and reflective decision to do so’.42
Patients should be warned of the possible ‘burden of
facing what may be a morally difficult decision in the
future’ and it should be acknowledged that they are likely
to change their minds about disposition over time.43
De Lacey concludes that ‘choosing a destiny for frozen
residual embryos is a challenging and complex process’.44
Clearly freezing buys time and that is not an insignificant
consideration; there is, for example, a degree of revers-
ibility in the decision to freeze (at least for the 60%–70%
of embryos that thaw successfully) that is not present in
the decisions to discard or to give to research or treatment
of others.45 However, the problems arising from freezing
that have been described hitherto have to be balanced
against these benefits. Taken as a whole, these data and
observations suggest that a cautious approach by fertility
clinics towards freezing is a reasonable strategy.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In agreeing with McLeod and Baylis about patients’
needs for time, reflection and distance, but in having
some reservations about freezing as a means to that end,
we have the following suggestions to make.
Our first suggestion is that clinics requesting embryos
for hESC research (or considering entering into such
practices) could follow different practices for the first and
subsequent cycles of IVF. We suggest that patients are
not asked to donate fresh embryos for hESC research in
their first cycle of IVF, since this is experienced by
patients as a particularly stressful and confusing time. A
delay in making research requests for fresh embryos
would at least ensure that the stress of IVF treatment,
coupled with the sense that there is so much going on in
the first cycle46 and the variable meanings that IVF
patients attach to embryos as they go through that pro-
cess,47 would all be experienced before the need to con-
sider other decisions about research. Therefore, when
those requests do arise, the potential providers are likely
to be more fully aware of the possible consequences for
themselves. Deferring the request to a later cycle would
also reduce the problem of the ‘troubling third embryo’,
as patients would be better informed by experience and
reflection, as well as by documentation, about the pos-
sible uses of their embryos, whatever the quality. Simi-
larly, the definitions of ‘spare embryos’ would be clearer,
since patients will be better equipped either to query this
term or even to negotiate their preferred definition with
the clinics. The deferring of requests until the second
cycle would also reduce or remove the suspicion that
‘research comes first’ in any of those clinics providing
embryos for stem cell scientists. Consequently the ethical
protection of patients would be enhanced.
There are of course practical consequences of this sug-
gestion. If only two (or one, under single embryo transfer
protocols) embryos are transferred back to the woman
there might be other good quality embryos remaining.
The decision in the first cycle over what should happen to
these should rest with the patients, given the time, physi-
cal and emotional effort, and money they have invested in
their production. This could lead to a marginal increase
in numbers frozen after first cycles which might be con-
sidered an odd outcome, given the concerns that have
been raised in this paper so far about the problems asso-
ciated with freezing. However, there are ways to avoid an
increase in the overall total of embryos frozen across all
cycles (see below) and anyway this marginal increase
would not equal the numbers frozen if McLeod and
Baylis’ suggestions are followed. There would also be a
reduction in the number of fresh embryos made available
for research, though again the suggestion below might
counter the effects of this.
Just as we suggest the first cycle follow a conservative
policy on research and a liberal policy on freezing, we
suggest that the second and subsequent cycles follow a
36 Bankowski et al., op. cit. note 15.
37 de Lacey, op. cit. note 16.
38 Klock et al., op. cit. note 27; Newton et al., op. cit. note 29.
39 Bankowski et al., op. cit. note 15; Nachtigall et al., op. cit. note 33.
40 Lyerly et al., op. cit. note 15, p. 1626.
41 Ibid: 1627.
42 Ibid: 1629.
43 Ibid: 1629.
44 de Lacey, op. cit. note 16, p. 109.
45 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this
point.
46 C.B. Cohen. Use of ‘Excess’ Human Embryos for Stem Cell
Research: Protecting Women’s Rights and Health. Women’s Health
Issues, 2000: 121–126.
47 E. Haimes, R. Porz, J. Leach Scully, & C. Rehmann-Sutter, “So,
what is an embryo?” A comparative study of the views of those asked to
donate embryos for hESC research in the UK and Switzerland, New
Genet Soc 2008; 27: 113–126.
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liberal policy on research and a conservative policy on
freezing. That is, that the request to provide embryos for
research should be allowed, since there is little evidence
that this in itself causes patients distress.48 The embryos
requested might come from frozen stores or be fresh,
from new treatment. Patients who feel better informed,
feel that their needs are being protected, and are less
suspicious about the priorities of clinics, might well be
happier about donating fresh embryos in subsequent
cycles. Patients’ attitudes towards the supply of embryos
(defined as ‘spare’ according to criteria agreed with
patients) might well be more consistent across cycles in
the future.
Whilst freezing would still be made available in second
and subsequent cycles, the dis-benefits of freezing need to
be more fully explored with patients than seems currently
to be the case. It could be argued that a cautious policy on
freezing should be more widely followed by all clinics in
second and subsequent cycles, to avoid the build up of the
many problems described earlier.49 If the practice of mild
ovarian stimulation50 gains acceptance it might well be
the case that fewer embryos are produced in the first place
and the dilemma of freezing, or not, is reduced for both
patients and clinics.51
Fertility treatment is a notoriously tricky area to nego-
tiate, in both practical and ethical terms: its history is
peppered with practices that were initially seen as solu-
tions to problems but subsequently became the source of
problems themselves. The practices of embryo freezing
and requesting embryos for stem cell research are no
different. Having based the above suggestions on empiri-
cal evidence, we also advocate, of course, that the ethical
evaluation of any new patterns of practice along the lines
suggested is also informed by empirical analysis.
However, when navigating routes through and around
the many issues that need to be considered when explor-
ing the problems discussed in this article, the most impor-
tant consideration, we suggest, should be the ethical
protection of patients.
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